The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

许多人共同使用的自然资源的管理是政策分析家们越来越关注的问题。国家控制和资源私有化都被提倡，但无论是国家还是市场都没有在解决公共资源问题上取得一致的成功。在批评了应用于自然资源的政策分析的基础之后，埃莉诺-奥斯特罗姆在这里提供了一套独特的经验数据，以探索共同拥有的资源问题在哪些条件下得到了满意或不满意的解决。奥斯特罗姆博士利用制度分析探讨了治理公地的不同方式--包括成功的和不成功的。与 "公地悲剧 "论点不同的是，公地问题有时是由自愿组织而不是由强制性的国家来解决的。在所考虑的案例中，有草地和森林的公有制，灌溉社区和其他水权，以及渔业。