Mission command involves the way in which “commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions.”1 This report examines the effectiveness of mission command training conducted by different types of functional and multifunctional (F/MF) brigade headquarters in preparation for large-scale combat operations (LSCO).2 The U.S. Army’s exercise of mission command as part of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) differs from the way that it would do so as part of LSCO. Army leaders have expressed concerns that the abilities of leaders and their staffs to exercise mission command as part of LSCO have atrophied. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 emphasizes that forces must be ready to deploy and immediately enter the fight in a fast-moving, contested, antiaccess and area denial environment—which places a premium on the quality and rigor of peacetime training.3 RAND researchers’ objective was to identify gaps in current training approaches for LSCO and recommend ways that these gaps could be overcome.

Overall, we find that the Army provides valuable mission command training opportunities for many F/MF brigade headquarters. However, various limitations mean that training falls short of a true gold standard for LSCO. The Warfighter Exercise (WFX)—a multiechelon, simulation-driven command post exercise for units at the corps, division, and brigade headquarters levels—provides what is arguably the Army’s premier mission training opportunity for F/MF brigade headquarters. WFX training surpasses what units can accomplish at home station in many ways. Joint and combined exercises also provide venues with significant training benefits, but these often complement, rather than substitute for, the training that a WFX provides.