Our focus in this book, however, is on whether incentives generated by bank executives’ compensation programs contributed to excessive risk taking. We recommend the following compensation structure for bank executives: incentive compensation should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options – restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for one to three years after his or her last day in office. We contend that this incentive compensation package will focus bank managers’ attention on the long run and discourage them from investing in high-risk, value-destroying projects. We discuss and provide solutions to many of the caveats that arise, specifically regarding underdiversification and loss of liquidity.

我们在本书中关注的是，银行高管薪酬计划所产生的激励措施是否会导致过度冒险。我们建议银行高管的薪酬结构如下：激励性薪酬应仅包括限制性股票和限制性股票期权——限制性薪酬是指高管在任职最后一天之后的一至三年内不能出售股票或行使期权。我们认为，这一激励性薪酬方案将把银行经理的注意力集中在长期，并阻止他们投资于高风险、价值受损的项目。我们讨论并提供解决方案，以解决出现的许多警告，特别是有关多元化不足和流动性损失。