Can China build on its development success to achieve high-income status in the decades ahead? The experience of Japan, South Korea, and some smaller Pacific Rim economies suggests that such an outcome is possible. But most economies deliver unimpressive growth after reaching China’s current income level, giving rise to the notion of a “middle-income trap.” To shed light on what the future may hold for China, we rely on a neoclassical growth framework. Our key finding is that China would need to sustain total factor productivity growth at the top end of the range achieved by its Pacific Rim neighbors in order to match their success in raising per capita incomes. Whereas fast-growing working-age populations boosted per capita income growth in the Pacific Rim, a rapidly aging population will act as a powerful drag on income growth in China. Moreover, China’s capital-intensive production structure will make it difficult to match the returns to capital accumulation achieved by those countries at a similar level of income. This article proceeds as follows: Section 1 places China’s growth performance of recent decades in international and historical perspective and also wades into the debate concerning the accuracy of China’s growth statistics. We find that China’s growth performance remains among the strongest on record, regardless of whether official figures or skeptics’ estimates are closer to the mark. Section 2 shows how the neoclassical growth model can be used to break down GDP growth into contributions from labor force growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. The framework enables us to show how China’s growth performance is already feeling the weight of slower labor-force growth and diminishing returns to capital. Section 3 reviews the evidence for a “middle-income trap,” confirming the finding from other studies that middle-income countries tend to remain in that category for decades. Section 4 relies on the neoclassical model to analyze countries’ growth performance after reaching China’s current income level. We find a strong tendency toward growth slowdowns, with notably reduced contributions from capital accumulation and technical change. These results help inform parameter choices for our projection exercise. Section 5 details our projection results, which highlight that rapid growth will require exceptional productivity gains, given drags stemming from demographic pressures and diminishing returns to capital. Section 6 considers factors that could provide scope for continued rapid growth in China as well as factors that could impede it. China’s low current per capita income relative to that of global leaders and its low rate of urbanization point to clear upside potential for growth. But to realize this potential, China must overcome challenges stemming from lagging institutional development and the state’s pervasive role in the economy. Section 7 concludes.